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RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA
David E. Campbell*
INTRODUCTION
The role of religion in American society presents a puzzle. This
puzzle receives far less attention than it should-indeed, most Ameri-
cans probably give it no thought. But when we compare the contem-
porary United States either to other periods in this country's history
or to other societies today, the puzzle appears in stark relief. Some-
how, American society manages to blend three religious characteris-
tics together: religiously devout, religiously diverse, and religiously
tolerant.
The puzzle of how contemporary American society fuses devotion,
diversity, and tolerance comprises the central theme of American
Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us, which Robert Putnam
and I published in 2010.1 This Article begins by briefly summarizing
the argument and evidence presented in American Grace. Next, I
consider three potential challenges to religious tolerance that are cur-
rently unfolding in American society-the rising number of religiously
unaffiliated Americans, Americans' attitudes toward Islam, and the
place of Mormonism within the American religious mosaic. As I ex-
plain, each one represents a challenge to the story of America as a
religiously tolerant nation, and will continue to do so in the short-
term. However, even though they may currently appear as exceptions
to the "rule" of religious tolerance, there is good reason to expect that
the unaffiliated, Muslims, and Mormons will eventually prove the rule
after all (perhaps sooner than many think). Yet, lest one think that
this is a story with an inevitably happy ending, this Article concludes
by grappling with the long-term implications of religious tolerance.
Does religious tolerance inevitably mean the end of "prophetic" relig-
ion? For any particular religion, is the price of acceptability a loss of
religious vitality?
* Professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame and the founding director of
the Rooney Center for the Study of American Democracy.
1. ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE: How RELIGION DIVIDES
AND UNITES Us 4 (2010).
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II. DEVOTION, DIVERSITY, AND TOLERANCE
In this Part, I lay out the evidence for our claim that America can
accurately be described as religiously devout, diverse, and tolerant.
Having entered our evidence into the record, I then make a case for
how the three pieces of the puzzle fit together harmoniously.
The claim that America scores high on religious devotion generally
meets with little controversy. No matter the indicator of religiosity,
Americans score well above the citizens of most other advanced in-
dustrialized nations. For example, according to the World Values Sur-
vey, 36% of Americans report attending religious services once a
week or more. That compares to 7% of French, 8% of Germans, 12%
of Dutch, 14% of Australians, and 17% of Britons. At 25%, even
Canada-a country that shares both a border and much of its culture
with the United States-has a lower rate of weekly religious attend-
ance.2 Granted, there is some debate over the accuracy of religious
attendance measurements. 3 But even if self-reports of attendance are
inflated, I submit that it is still socially significant that nearly 40% of
Americans think of themselves-or want to be perceived by others-
as regular attendees of religious services. While we will see evidence
that religion is on the decline in America, this ebb should be placed in
the context of a flow that, historically, has kept religiosity relatively
high. My point is simply that while we can debate the precision of
how religiosity is measured and speculate about long-term trends for
religion in American society, compared to its international peers, the
United States today is a religious nation.
Americans are not only religiously devout, America is religiously
diverse. "Diversity" can have different connotations; in this context,
religious diversity simply means that the United States is home to a
multiplicity of religions, such that no single religion or religious group
has anywhere near a majority of the population. Because there are
hundreds of different religious denominations, especially within Prot-
estantism, social scientists studying religion typically group similar de-
2. The statistics come from my analysis of the latest wave of the World Values Survey,
2005-2008. WORLD VALUES SURVEY, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org (last visited June 7,
2013) (follow "Online Data Analysis" hyperlink; then follow "Begin Analysis" hyperlink; then
select "WVS 2005-2008" hyperlink; then select countries to compare and follow "Confirm Selec-
tion" hyperlink; then select "Religion and Morale" section and follow "How often do you attend
religious services" hyperlink; then select "Cross-tabs" tab).
3. See C. Kirk Hadaway et al., What the Polls Don't Show: A Closer Look at U.S. Church
Attendance, 58 AM. Soc. REV. 741, 741-43 (1993); Tom W. Smith, A Review of Church Attend-
ance Measures, 63 AM. Soc. REV. 131, 131 (1998); Robert D. Woodbury, When Surveys Lie and
People Tell the Truth: How Surveys Oversample Church Attenders, 63 AM. Soc. REV. 119, 119
(1998).
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nominations into a smaller set of religious families, or traditions. 4 But
even when we look at this smaller set of religious traditions-that is,
groups of denominations-no single one constitutes a majority of the
population. According to the 2011 Faith Matters survey, evangelical
Protestants comprise the single largest religious tradition in America
today, with 31% of the population. Thirty-one percent of the U.S.
population is no doubt substantial, but it is not a majority. Roughly
22% of the U.S. population identifies as Catholic, about the same
share as the last forty years.5 Rounding out the list of major religious
traditions in America, the next largest group is the "nones"-people
who do not identify with any religion. I discuss the nones in depth
below, but for now I note that they have only emerged in large num-
bers over roughly the last twenty years and have continued growing in
number. According to the 2011 Faith Matters survey, 19% of Ameri-
cans say that they have no religion. More recently, the Pew Forum on
Religion and Public Life found roughly 20% of the U.S. to be nones. 6
More Americans today report having no religion than identify with a
mainline Protestant denomination (13%).7 Given that mainline Prot-
estantism has historically been the de facto establishment religion in
America, its loss of "market share" has been a stunning change in the
religious landscape.
Rounding out the list of major religious traditions, there are the
African-American Protestants (9%), who are considered a distinct re-
ligious tradition because of the historical legacy of racial segregation.,
Then there are the Jews (2%) and the Mormons (2%). Some readers
may find it surprising that there are as many Mormons in America as
Jews. Below, I will have more to say about the place of Mormons in
American society, particularly given their recent media prominence in
the wake of Mitt Romney's presidential campaign.
4. See Brian Steensland et al., The Measure of American Religion: Toward Improving the
State-of-the-Art, 79 Soc. FORCES 291, 292 (2000); Lyman A. Kellstedt et al., Grasping the Essen-
tials: The Social Embodiment of Religion and Political Behavior, in JOHN C. GREEN ET AL.,
RELIGION AND THE CULTURE WARS 174, 176 (1996).
5. PUTNAM & CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 16-17, The seemingly steady state of the Catholic
population masks a stunning demographic change, whereby Anglo Catholics have been leaving
the Church in droves, only to be replaced by Latino Catholics. See id. at 265, 299.
6. PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., "NONES" ON THE RISE:
ONE-IN-FIVE ADULTS HAVE No RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION 9 (2012) [hereinafter "NONES" ON THE
RISE], available at www.pewforum.org/uploadedfiles/Topics/ReligiousAffiliation/Unaffiliated/
NonesOnTheRise-full.pdf.
7. PUTNAM & CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 16-17.
8. Cf C. ERIC LINCOLN & LAWRENCE H. MAMIYA, THE BLACK CHURCH IN THE AFRICAN-
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, at xi (1990).
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There is also a long tail of other religious groups in America that,
while small in terms of their proportion of the overall population,
nonetheless have many thousands (or more) of adherents. Many of
these groups are also growing, through both immigration and rela-
tively high birth rates. A partial list includes Muslims, Buddhists,
Hindus, Sikhs, and Jains. In sum, no matter how we define, classify,
and categorize the plethora of religions, there can be no doubt that
America is a religiously diverse nation.
If we think about the nature of religion, we might expect a combina-
tion of devotion and diversity to be explosive, perhaps even leading to
violence. Over the course of America's past, religious diversity has
indeed sparked conflict. Jews and Catholics of yesteryear faced perse-
cution and mob violence just as Muslims and Sikhs do today. And
Mormons, members of a religion born and raised in the United States,
were once embroiled in violent confrontation and continue to face
rhetorical opprobrium. Looking around the world, mixing religiosity
with religious pluralism has often led to deeply divided societies-
think Baghdad and Belfast. And yet, notwithstanding these prece-
dents for societal turmoil, America has a remarkably high degree of
religious tolerance.
I expect that little controversy accompanies the claims that Ameri-
cans are, on average, religiously devout and that America, taken as a
whole, is religiously diverse. The claim that Americans are religiously
tolerant, however, is another matter. Is this not a nation where film-
makers make movie trailers offensive to Islam, pastors burn the Ko-
ran, and gunmen attack Sikh temples? It is; but it is better described
as a nation where most people have no problem with members of
other faiths and overwhelmingly believe that there are many roads to
heaven. In the 2011 Faith Matters survey, Putnam and I asked a rep-
resentative sample of Americans who had indicated a belief in God,
"Can a good person not of your faith go to heaven, or attain salva-
tion?" 9 Overwhelmingly, they said yes, regardless of their own relig-
ious background. Eighty-nine percent of the Americans surveyed
believe that people of other faiths can go to heaven. This includes
97% of Catholics, 93% of mainline Protestants, 82% of African-
American Protestants, and even 81% of evangelical Protestants. To
9. The Faith Matters survey is a nationally representative survey of 3,108 respondents that
were first interviewed in 2006. See PUTNAM & CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 558. The same re-
spondents were re-interviewed in 2007 and 2011. More details on the methodology of this sur-
vey can be found in Appendix 1 of American Grace. ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E.
CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE: How RELIGION DIVIDES AND UNITES Us 551 (first Simon &
Schuster trade paperback ed. 2012).
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test the limits of this all-inclusive heaven, Christian respondents were
asked a follow-up specifying that this hypothetical good person is not
a Christian. Among Catholics and mainline Protestants, the numbers
barely budged, as 87% of the former and 73% of the latter said that
even non-Christians were welcome in heaven. Among African-Amer-
ican and evangelical Protestants, the numbers dropped more, but a
majority of both groups do not see Christianity as a prerequisite for
heaven.10
This question is not the only witness we can call to the stand to
testify on behalf of America's religious tolerance. In our survey, we
also asked whether religious diversity has been good for America.
Again, an overwhelming percentage of Americans-no matter their
religious background or intensity of religious commitment-say yes.
Eighty-six percent of the most secular Americans see the virtue of
religious diversity, compared to 74% of the most highly religious."
Still, you might be skeptical of what this question really tells us.
After all, "diversity" is a buzzword glowing with a positive sheen. As
further evidence of Americans' comfort with religions other than their
own, consider that 80% of the population believe that "basic truths
can be found in many religions," compared to 7% who say that there
is very little truth in any religion and 13% who believe that only one
religion (presumably their own) is true.12
What, though, do these data actually mean? Do they actually re-
flect tolerance? I readily concede that, particularly for the theologi-
cally fraught question regarding who goes to heaven, there may be
terms more appropriate than tolerance. Perhaps we should call it re-
ligious acceptance. Whatever label we put on it, these data speak to a
powerful fact about Americans today. Most Americans, most of the
time, are accepting of most other religions. There are important ex-
ceptions, as I will discuss, but those exceptions should not distract us
from the relative state of religious harmony in America today.
What explains America's unusual-arguably unique-ability to
combine a high degree of religiosity, a stunning multiplicity of reli-
gions, and a general attitude of "live and let live?" The answer is your
"Aunt Susan." Your Aunt Susan is an archetype of that person in
10. Fifty-nine percent of African-American Protestants say a non-Christian can go to heaven,
and 55% of evangelicals say the same. Note that the numbers reported here are slightly differ-
ent from those found in American Grace, PUTNAM & CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 536, as these
are from 2011 and the book reports data from 2007. Nonetheless, the differences between 2007
and 2011 are small.
11. PUTNAM & CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 520, 521 fig.15.1.
12. These numbers come from the author's analysis of the 2011 Faith Matters survey.
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your life who is the kindest, sweetest, most saintly person you know.
You know that if there is a heaven, Aunt Susan will be there. Yet you
also know that Aunt Susan worships at a different altar than you. Ac-
cording to the theology of your religion, Aunt Susan is not going to
heaven; however, your personal experience says otherwise. When
faced with the choice between their theology and their saintly Aunt
Susan, most Americans side with Aunt Susan.
In our analysis, Putnam and I found that almost all Americans have
an Aunt Susan in their lives. More technically, virtually all Americans
have neighbors, close friends, and family members of other faiths.
Perhaps the most telling evidence of religious intermingling lies in at-
titudes toward interfaith marriage, which have undergone a quiet
revolution. Once controversial and even verboten in many circles, to-
day marriages across religious lines have become nearly as common as
marriages between spouses of the same faith. 13 But what is the result
of all of this interreligious mixing and matching? Perhaps not surpris-
ingly, close relationships with people of other faiths correlate with a
positive regard for people of other religions.
Our evidence goes beyond a mere correlation, though. Because the
Faith Matters survey consists of repeated interviews with the same
people, we can trace what happens when people become friends with
those of other religions. When we published American Grace, Putnam
and I could only report on changes in friendships over the relatively
brief span of about a year (2006-2007). Following the publication of
the book, we returned once more to the same respondents in 2011,
five years after our initial interviews. Whether we examine changes in
friendships over one year or five years, our conclusion remains the
same.14 When people add a friend of another faith, they have a higher
regard for that faith. 15 Put another way, our data show that if you
become friends with, for example, an evangelical Protestant, your atti-
tude toward evangelicals becomes more positive. In addition to the
archetype of Aunt Susan, American Grace also introduces your meta-
phorical "pal Al." Al is a friend who, you discover, has a different
religious background than yours. Just as Aunt Susan led you to ex-
pand your notion of who goes to heaven, your friendship with Al en-
courages you to think more favorably of everyone who shares his
religious background.
13. See PUTNAM & CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 149-51.
14. Readers interested in the details of the econometric models upon which these statements
are based can consult Appendix 2 of American Grace. See id. at 563-69.
15. See id.
1014 [Vol. 62:1009
RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE IN AMERICA
The "pal Al" principle confirms the long-standing theory of social
contact from social psychology. 16 Under the right conditions, greater
contact between people from different backgrounds diminishes
prejudice. Theory aside, it probably confirms the way most people
think the world works.
More intriguing, however, is our finding that an increase in the re-
ligious diversity of one's friendship network leads to a higher regard
for other religions not represented within the network. If you begin to
think more favorably of Al's religion, then perhaps other religions are
not so bad either. In other words, become friends with an evangelical
and you will feel better about Mormons. Furthermore, we find that
having a more religiously diverse group of friends leads people to
agree that to be a good American one does not have to believe in
God. I return to this finding below, as we see that it is significant for
what it portends given the rising number of Americans who disclaim a
religious affiliation.
To sum up the argument of American Grace, Americans experience
religious comity because they have formed a web of interlocking so-
cial relationships across religious lines. Amazingly, this religious
bridge building is common notwithstanding the fact that religion has
become a potently divisive factor in partisan politics.1 7 While
America's political parties have become divided by religion, Ameri-
cans themselves have increasingly woven social webs that include peo-
ple of many different religious backgrounds. Indeed, Americans are
more likely to have friends of a different religion than a different po-
litical party.18 It is these interreligious relationships that Putnam and I
describe as "America's grace" because they have enabled Americans
to combine devotion and diversity with tolerance rather than turmoil.
III. WHY SO MANY AUNT SUSANS AND PAL ALS?
What has led America to be graced with this high degree of interre-
ligious bridging? A major contributing factor is the nation's high rate
16. See GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 261, 264 (unabr. 25th anniversary
ed. 1979); Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, Does Intergroup Contact Reduce Prejudice?
Recent Meta-Analytic Findings, in REDUCING PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 93, 93-94 (Stuart
Oskamp ed., 2000); Thomas F. Pettigrew, Intergroup Contact Theory, 49 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL.
65, 65-68 (1998).
17. See JOHN C. GREEN, THE FAITH FACTOR: How RELIGION INFLUENCES AMERICAN ELEC-
TIONS 19 (2007); GEOFFREY LAYMAN, THE GREAT DIVIDE: RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL CON-
FLICT IN AMERICAN PARTY POLITICS 3 (2001); DAVID C. LEEGE ET AL., THE POLITICS OF
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 13 (2002).
18. According to the 2011 Faith Matters survey, roughly half of Americans' close friends prac-
tice a different religion, while about a third have a different political party preference.
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of religious flux. Americans often switch religions. Between 35% and
40% of all Americans, including 40% to 45% of whites, switch reli-
gions at some point in their lives.19 And this does not count Ameri-
cans who stay within a given religion but switch from one
congregation to another.
The fluidity of religious attachments contributes to interreligious
bridging because it means that many, perhaps most, Americans have
friends and family-or even a spouse-who have changed religions.
Even without adding a single new friend or family member, religious
flux alone can lead to increasing religious diversity within a social net-
work. For example, Al, your longtime Baptist friend, converts to Ca-
tholicism. I suspect that the high degree of religious switching also
contributes to interreligious personal relationships by reinforcing a so-
cial norm that, in America, religion is a "preference," rather than a
fixed, ascriptive characteristic. 20 In other cultures, religion is either
difficult or impossible to change. In America, it is both easy and
common.
If the frequency of religious switching fosters the conditions for in-
terreligious bridging, what fosters religious switching? One extremely
important contributing factor is the unique protection provided to re-
ligion by the U.S. Constitution. Together, the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment have created something like
a "greenhouse effect," in which a diverse religious ecosphere has
thrived. Although it took a few decades for a consensus to emerge
that "no established religion" included states as well as the federal
government,21 eventually the absence of any government support for
specific denominations ensured that religions in America could only
survive and flourish by attracting and retaining believers.22 With no
claim on the public purse, religions must convince people to contrib-
ute their own treasure freely. Any religion that does not teach a gos-
pel that adherents find appealing will eventually wither and die.
Furthermore, the Free Exercise Clause ensures legal protection for
19. PUTNAM & CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 137.
20. See Clyde Wilcox et al., Religious Preferences and Social Science: A Second Look, 70 J.
POL. 874, 876-77 (2008); cf. Joshua Mitchell, Religion Is Not a Preference, 69 J. POL. 351, 351, 354
(2007); Joshua Mitchell, A Reply to My Critics, 70 J. POL. 880, 880-83 (2008).
21. NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM-AND WHAT
WE SHOULD Do ABOUT IT 173 (2005) ("Once the Supreme Court had decided to allow taxpayer
standing to sue for a violation of the Establishment Clause, it also broke new ground by officially
recognizing that the separation of church and state at the level of state government was now a
requirement of the federal Constitution."); see also PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE (2002).
22. See ROGER FINKE & RODNEY STARK, THE CHURCHING OF AMERICA, 1776-2005: WIN-
NERS AND LOSERS IN OUR RELIGIOUS ECONOMY 3 (2005).
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many (albeit not all) distinctive religious practices. It also creates an
entrepreneurial climate for new religions to emerge, as evidenced by
the long and varied list of new and innovative religions born in
America. That tally includes Mormons, Christian Scientists, Pentecos-
tals, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Seventh-Day Adventists, among others.
In addition to the birth of new religions, even long-standing reli-
gions in America are rife with innovation. Examples of religious inno-
vation are legion,23 but one relatively recent example stands out for its
success, namely the mega-church. As a term of art, "mega" does not
simply connote size; it has also come to mean a particular organiza-
tional form. These churches have memberships in the thousands and
even tens of thousands, and thus hold very large worship meetings.
However, those massive meetings are complemented by small study
groups of perhaps a dozen people, often organized around affinities
(like mountain biking) or demographics (moms with toddlers). In
other words, the mega-church is a form of religion tailor-made to pro-
vide a sense of community during a time when other local institutions
are disappearing and social capital is declining. 24 While the mega-
church is an example of a religious innovation that has spread nation-
wide through replication, on a smaller scale local clergy are constantly
and quietly experimenting, fine-tuning, and tweaking their many ef-
forts to maintain and grow their congregations. 2
5
Loosely speaking, the Establishment Clause has ensured that
Americans have many religious options; the Free Exercise Clause en-
sures that these options are distinctive choices and not merely echoes
of one another. Together, these two constitutional provisions have
nurtured a culture in which Americans find it perfectly natural to refer
to "church shopping." The result is a highly fluid religious ecosystem
with a high rate of religious switching.
American Grace ends on an optimistic note. Putnam and I empha-
size that America is, for the most part, a religiously tolerant nation.
Most Americans get along with most people of most other religions,
most of the time. Most, however, falls short of all because there are
some partial exceptions to the general state of religious tolerance.
Furthermore, there are developments on the horizon that threaten to
disrupt the norm of religious acceptance. Putnam and I touch on
these briefly in American Grace, but here I will go into more detail.
23. Cf ALAN WOLFE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN RELIGION 3 (2005).
24. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 27, 409 (2000).
25. For more discussion of the mega-church as an organizational form, see PUTNAM & CAMP-
BELL, supra note 1, at 37, 54-55. For more on religious innovations generally, see id. at 161-62.
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While I use many of the empirical findings I discuss from the joint
project with Putnam, any normative implications are mine alone.
IV. NONES
Perhaps the most significant development in the American religious
landscape over the last two decades is the stunning rise of people who
report having no religious affiliation. When asked what their religion
is, they answer "none." For many decades, the percentage of Ameri-
cans who said that they had no religious affiliation remained steady at
somewhere between 5% and 7%. Then, in the early 1990s, that num-
ber began to rise. According to the General Social Survey, it grew to
9% in 1993, 14% in 1998, 17% in 2008, and 18% in 2010. A 2012
study by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life found that ap-
proximately 20% of Americans now report that they do not have a
religious affiliation. 26 At some point, the number of these nones will
presumably hit a ceiling and stop growing, but that plateau has not yet
been reached.
The rising number of nones presents a risk to religious tolerance in
America, as their presence could lead to tensions between religious
Americans, of whatever stripe, and secular Americans. In a theme
that will be repeated throughout the remainder of this Article, the risk
lies in the potential for these tensions to exacerbate our existing parti-
san divisions. Indeed, in a classic case of a feedback loop, it was those
very divisions that led to the growth of the nones in the first place.
The best available evidence indicates that an increasing number of
Americans have walked away from religion because they equate relig-
ion with partisan politics, and specifically right wing politics. This is
especially true among millennials (people under thirty), who have
come of age in a period of religion-infused politics and politics-infused
religion. To them, religion means conservative politics and the Re-
publican Party. This is neither their politics nor their party, and so
they decide that religion is not for them.
Sociologists Claude Fischer and Michael Hout first advanced the
argument that the growth of the nones resulted from a reaction to the
emergence of the "Religious Right. ' 27 At the time of their seminal
article, the evidence for the rise of the nones was only circumstantial.
Like the climactic scene in an Agatha Christie mystery, they elimi-
nated every other culprit until "politics did it" remained the only via-
26. "NONES" ON THE RISE, supra note 6, at 6.
27. Michael Hout & Claude S. Fischer, Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference:
Politics and Generations, 67 AM. Soc. REV. 165, 168 (2002).
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ble possibility. Hout and Fischer proved prescient; the ensuing years
brought to light evidence in support of their claim. 28 In particular,
Putnam and I found compelling evidence of precisely the process first
described by Hout and Fischer and since confirmed by others. We
again draw on our survey of repeated interviews with the same people
over a five-year period. In doing so, we found that a powerful predic-
tor of leaving religion-that is, becoming a none-is a respondent's
moderate-to-liberal politics. Furthermore, those who became nones
were also much more likely to oppose the mixture of religion and
politics than those who stuck with religion over this five-year period. 29
There is great irony that the rise of the Religious Right, and its in-
corporation into the Republican Party, has triggered this wave of peo-
ple turning away from religion. The Religious Right was ostensibly
formed to reassert the place of religion-or, at least, a particular type
of religion-in American society. 30 While the movement has ensured
that issues relating to religion are a regular feature of our politics, it
has done so at the price of collateral damage to religion writ large.
A full assessment of the nones' impact on American society re-
quires an accurate understanding of who they are. Importantly, most
nones are not atheists. In fact, only about a quarter say that they defi-
nitely do not believe in God. According to the Pew Forum, 2.4% of
the U.S. population describe themselves as atheists, which means that
a fair number of people who meet the technical definition of an athe-
ist are nonetheless resistant to the label.31 No matter how atheists are
defined, they still remain a small share of the overall population. Fur-
thermore, many nones have not completely disconnected from relig-
ion. Roughly half say that they pray at least occasionally, 25% say
that they have "very often" experienced God's love, and 10% even
report attending religious services monthly or more.32
In other words, the nones should not be considered completely lost
to religion. Roughly half are not even full-time nones. Instead, they
are what Putnam and I call "liminals"-people who straddle two iden-
28. SUSAN B. HANSEN, RELIGION AND REACTION: THE SECULAR POLITICAL CHALLENGE TO
THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT 28-29 (2011); Stratos Patrikios, American Republican Religion? Disen-
tangling the Causal Link Between Religion and Politics in the U.S., 30 POL. BEHAV. 367, 369
(2008).
29. See PUTNAM & CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 121, 127.
30. See CLYDE WILCOX & CARIN ROBINSON, ONWARD CHRISTIAN SOLDIERS? THE RELIG-
IOUS RIGHT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 8 (4th ed. 2011).
31. See "NONES" ON THE RISE, supra note 6, at 13.
32. These numbers come from the 2011 Faith Matters survey.
2013] 1019
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
tities.33 In the course of interviewing and re-interviewing Americans,
we found that only half of people who say that they have no religion
at one point in time did so at another. The rest report an affiliation,
even while exhibiting no sign of religious conversion or reawakening.
Rather, these are people with a tenuous hold on a religious identity.
Like a faulty light switch, it flickers on and off. These liminals are not
ardent secularists, hostile to religion. A number of scholars refer to
them as "spiritual but not religious. '34 This label accurately reflects
their reluctance to embrace the label of an organized religion, al-
though it is not a term in widespread use. In our interviews, we found
that very few Americans separate the concepts of "being spiritual"
and "being religious." Most treat them as synonyms-to be spiritual
is to be religious.
The mere fact that the nones are growing in number is not in and of
itself a threat to religious tolerance. Rather, tolerance is at risk if
there is antagonism between the nones and, for lack of a better word,
the "religionists." And the risk is even greater if that antagonism
aligns with partisan hostilities. If Republicans rail against secularists
and Democrats against religionists, religion becomes a proxy war for
partisan hostilities. I would contend that holy wars-even those
fought rhetorically-can do great damage to the fabric of civil society.
While the heat of political battle can inflame tensions between reli-
gionists and the nones, another powerful force works to tamp down
the hostility between the two camps. Remember our pal Al? Many,
probably most, nones have a friend who is religious; likewise, an in-
creasing number of Americans with a religious affiliation have a non-
religious friend. In 2006, 44% of Americans said that they had a close
friend who is "not religious." By 2011, that number had grown to
51%. 35 Just as personal relationships between people of different
faiths smooth out interreligious tensions, relationships between nones
and religionists improve both groups' perceptions of one another. Al-
ready, we have seen evidence that nones can be welcomed into Amer-
ican society. Recall that greater religious diversity within friendship
33. For more on liminals, see Chaeyoon Lim, Carol Ann MacGregor & Robert D. Putnam,
Secular and Liminal: Discovering Heterogeneity Among Religious Nones, 49 J. FOR ScI. STUD.
RELIGION 596, 596-98 (2010).
34. See ROBERT C. FULLER, SPIRITUAL, BUT NOT RELIGIOUS: UNDERSTANDING UN-
CHURCHED AMERICA 4 (2001); see also PAUL HEELAS & LINDA WOODHEAD, THE SPIRITUAL
REVOLUTION: WHY RELIGION IS GIVING WAY TO SPIRITUALITY 1 (2005); Peter C. Hill et al.,
Conceptualizing Religion and Spirituality: Points of Commonality, Points of Departure, 30 J. FOR
THEORY SOC. BEHAV. 51, 61 (2000); Penny Long Marler & C. Kirk Hadaway, "Being Religious"
or "Being Spiritual" in America: A Zero-Sum Proposition?, 41 J. FOR SCI. STUD. RELIGION 289,
297 (2002).
35. These numbers come from the 2011 Faith Matters survey.
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networks corresponds with a higher likelihood of accepting that
nonbelievers can be good Americans. Of course, the existence of rela-
tionships between secular and religious Americans rests on whether
they have opportunities to mingle with one another. Should Ameri-
can society continue to segregate along cultural lines,36 perhaps nones
and religionists will have fewer and fewer opportunities to meet, be-
come friends, and develop an appreciation for one another.
I am not suggesting that such segregation is inevitable, or even
likely. Given the ebbs and flows of religion over the course of
America's past, it seems just as likely that there will be a reversal of
the growing number of nones. Remember that many nones remain
open to religious beliefs; they primarily take issue with the mixture of
religion and partisan politics. It seems possible, maybe even likely,
that they would be receptive to religion if the political tinge were re-
moved. Just as the mega-church was invented to compensate for a
diminishing sense of community, perhaps some religious entrepre-
neur(s) will craft a form of religion that appeals to the nones. The
data even suggest that some clergy have taken the first step-recogni-
tion of the problem. Comparing the 2006 and 2011 Faith Matters
surveys reveals a dramatic decline in political appeals made by their
clergy over this five-year period.37 It was as though clergy witnessed
the collateral damage being done by the mixture of religion and polit-
ics and reacted by refraining from further political activity. According
to the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, the trend appears to
have continued in 2012. In a pre-election report, the researchers at
Pew concluded that "[w]hile many regular churchgoers say they have
been encouraged to vote by their clergy, relatively few say church
leaders are discussing the candidates directly or favoring one candi-
date over the other. ' 38 The relative absence of partisan discussion
over the nation's pulpits is remarkable, given that the 2012 presiden-
tial election campaign featured abortion, gay marriage, contraception,
and the meaning of religious liberty as issues.
V. MUSLIMS
While the rise of the nones presents a potential threat to religious
tolerance in America, there is nothing "potential" about some Ameri-
36. BILL BISHOP WITH ROBERT G. CUSHING, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-
MINDED AMERICA Is TEARING Us APART 72-74 (First Mariner Books ed., 2009).
37. See PUTNAM & CAMPBELL, supra note 9, at 575-76.
38. PEW RESEARCH CTR., IN DEADLOCKED RACE, NEITHER SIDE HAS GROUND GAME AD-
VANTAGE 6 (2012), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/10-31-12%2OCam-
paign%200utreach%20Release.
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cans' intolerant attitudes toward Muslims. When Putnam and I asked
Americans about their perception of different religious groups, Mus-
lims ranked near the bottom (although atheists score lower).39 In ad-
dition, we also asked whether respondents would be bothered by the
construction of a Muslim mosque in their neighborhood. For compar-
ison's sake, we also asked respondents about their feelings toward a
Buddhist temple and a Christian church. Of the three religious struc-
tures, a mosque was met with the greatest opposition. Thirty-five per-
cent of Americans objected to a mosque, 25% to a Buddhist temple,
and 8% to a Christian church.40
Granted, these numbers can be interpreted in different ways. Com-
pared to other groups, Muslims have a relatively low score, but their
overall rating is still forty-three on a scale of 100, which has a neutral
point of fifty. Muslims are thus reasonably close to a neutral score.
And although more Americans object to a mosque than other places
of worship, two-thirds say that they would be fine if a mosque were
built in their neighborhood. My point is not to dismiss the reality of
anti-Muslim sentiment in American society, but only to note that neg-
ativity toward Muslims is not universal.
It is tempting to infer that Americans' suspicion toward Muslims
has resulted from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the
continuing attention to terrorists with a Muslim background. While
9/11 certainly has not helped the public perception of Muslims, their
"image problem" actually predates 2001. Detailing the pre-2001 per-
ception of Muslims, one paper memorably refers to Muslims as mem-
bers of a "band of others."'4'
There is an interesting parallel between Muslims today and both
Catholics and Jews in the past. Like Muslims, Catholics and Jews
were once reviled for their "exotic" beliefs, perceived insularity, un-
democratic values, and alleged control by foreign influences. Both the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw many battles-most legal,
some literal-over the place of Judaism and Catholicism in American
society.42 As recently as 1960, presidential candidate John F. Kennedy
had to face the question of whether a Catholic could serve as Presi-
dent. Today, however, Catholics stand squarely in the American
mainstream. In fact, according to the data Putnam and I collected,
39. PUTNAM & CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 504-08.
40. Id. at 493-515. We randomized the order in which respondents received the three differ-
ent places of worship, so as not to bias the results. In each case, we also specified that the
building under consideration would be "large."
41. Kerem Ozan Kalkan et al., "Bands of Others"? Attitudes Toward Muslims in Contempo-
rary American Society, 71 J. POL. 847 (2009).
42. FELDMAN, supra note 21, at 167-70.
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Catholics rank right next to Jews as the religious group viewed most
positively by the American public.43
It is worth underscoring that Catholics and Jews are viewed posi-
tively by their fellow Americans. Over the course of American his-
tory, both have suffered from discrimination and yet today they are
highly regarded. Although anti-Catholicism and anti-Semitism still
exist, both types of prejudice have moved from widespread cultural
acceptability to society's shadows.
While there are many reasons that Catholics and Jews have risen in
favor, at the top of the list is Aunt Susan. There are many Jewish and
Catholic Aunt Susans, and even more pal Als. America was once seg-
regated along religious lines such that Catholics, Protestants, and Jews
rarely intermingled. Today, Jews and Catholics are integrated into
every aspect of American society.
The path of Jews and Catholics should give hope to American Mus-
lims. While there is no guarantee that they too will eventually be met
with the same degree of approbation, history is on their side. The key
will be the assimilation-admittedly, a loaded word-of Muslims into
American society. This process appears to have begun. While Mus-
lims in Europe are often isolated and socially marginalized, in the
United States their education and income is very similar to the rest of
the American population. 44 As the Muslim population in America
grows, it remains an open question whether Muslims will increasingly
mingle and, more controversially, intermarry with non-Muslims. If
they do, I would expect their public perception to become more posi-
tive, although, as I explain below, this approval may come at a price
many Muslims are unwilling to pay.
Whatever the long-term trajectory of Americans' attitudes toward
Muslims, the current political environment presents a challenge to a
healthy state of religious tolerance. As with attitudes regarding the
nones, there is strong evidence for partisan polarization in attitudes
toward Muslims. In a statistical model that weighs the many possible
factors shaping Americans' attitudes toward Muslims-specifically, a
mosque in one's neighborhood-Putnam and I find that the impact of
party outweighs everything else, even religion. Compared to adher-
ents of other religious traditions, evangelical Protestants are slightly
more likely to be bothered by a mosque. And yet, compared to Dem-
ocrats and independents, Republicans are far more likely to object to
the construction of a mosque. Fifty-six percent of "strong" Republi-
43. PUTNAM & CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 505 fig.14.6.
44. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: No SIGNS OF GROWTH IN ALIENATION
OR SUPPORT FOR EXTREMISM 17 (2011).
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cans would be bothered by a mosque, far outnumbering the 31% of
independents and 24% of "strong" Democrats.45
As to why Republicans have such antipathy toward Muslims, there
are multiple possible hypotheses, including negative coverage of Mus-
lims in conservative media, criticism of Muslims by Republican politi-
cians, and less personal contact with Muslims among Republicans
than Democrats. Perhaps the explanation lies in some combination of
these factors, or in some other explanation altogether. Future re-
search should be directed toward explaining the portentous connec-
tion between partisanship and attitudes toward Muslims. Although
the reasons for this partisan inflection are unknown, it portends an
unhealthy state for religious tolerance in America. Partisanship rein-
forcement of negative attitudes toward Muslims does not bode well
for the broad acceptance of Muslims in all corners of American
society.
VI. MORMONS
Muslims are not the only religious group that faces derision in con-
temporary America. Mormons-more formally, members of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS Church)-are an-
other. Americans' perceptions of Mormons are not as low as Mus-
lims, but they rank below most other religious traditions.46
In some respects, the negativity Mormons face might seem puzzling.
After all, their church is one of those home-grown sects that have
flourished in America's entrepreneurial religious climate. And yet,
Mormonism has been controversial from the start. At its founding,
the fledgling faith's theology had plenty to offend-new scripture, the
audacious claim to be Christ's one and only true church, and a leader
proclaimed to be a prophet on par with Moses or Abraham of old.47
45. See PUTNAM & CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 504; see also E.J. DIONNE, JR. & WILLIAM A.
GALSTON, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, THE OLD AND NEW POLriIcs OF FAITH: RELIGION AND
THE 2010 ELECrION 1-2 (2010). The terms "strong" Republican and "strong" Democrat refer to
the standard scale used to measure differing degrees of attachment to a political party. Ratings
usually include strong Republican/Democrat, not so strong Republican/Democrat, independent
who leans toward one party or the other, or true independent.
46. PUTNAM & CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 505 fig.14.6.
47. MATrHiEW BOWMAN, THE MORMON PEOPLE: Ti-iE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN FAITH, at
xvii (2012) ("Mormons believe in the Bible, though Joseph Smith taught that errors and mis-
translations might sometimes compromise its text. They also use three other works of scripture:
the Book of Mormon, the record of an ancient American civilization the resurrected Christ vis-
ited; the Doctrine and Covenants, a collection of revelations given to Joseph Smith; and the
Pearl of Great Price, a collection of inspired texts mostly produced by Joseph Smith.").
Mormons believe that Christ established a church before his crucifixion, placed Peter
at its head, and gave that church priesthood authority to perform the sacraments of
[Vol. 62:10091024
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Most offensive of all was the nineteenth-century practice of polygamy
(long since abandoned by the LDS Church and now only practiced by
excommunicated fringe fundamentalists). 48
The controversy over Mormonism continues in the present. In a
recent survey, the Pew Research Center asked Americans for the first
word that comes to mind when they hear "Mormon" and found that
one of the most common responses was "cult. '49 In a similar survey,
Gallup found that "polygamy" tops the list of top-of-the-head impres-
sions.50  In 2012, Pew also found that 32% of Americans say that
Mormons are not Christians, a number that had not changed since
they asked the same question in 2007 and 2011.51 The Gallup Poll has
periodically asked voters whether they would vote for a Mormon
presidential candidate if nominated by their party. The percentage
saying that they would not has hovered between 17% and 24% since
1967, in sharp contrast to other groups-like Jews, Catholics, blacks,
and women-which meet with nearly universal approval. 52 The rela-
tively flat line for approval of Mormons contrasts with other groups,
salvation: baptism, confirmation, the Lord's supper, and other ordinances. But this au-
thority and this church were lost in the intervening centuries, and Mormons believe
that God chose Joseph Smith to restore them and, providentially, the United States of
America as the place where they could be restored....
In the strictest sense, Mormons do not believe that Joseph Smith established a "new"
church at all. For Mormons, the history of humanity is much like the history of the
Israelites in the Bible writ large .... It is also the history of God's true church, which
Mormons believe was given first to Adam, whom angels baptized and taught of Jesus
Christ, before his descendants collapsed into the wickedness from which Noah was sent
to save them. As was Abraham, as was Moses, as was, eventually, Joseph Smith him-
self. Each time humanity fell, God sent a priestly prophet to reorganize true worship
and teach true doctrine.
Id. at xvii-xviii.
48. See generally SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 27, 221 (2002).
49. How the Public Perceives Romney, Mormons, PEW F. ON RELIGIOUS & PUB. LIFE (Dec. 4,
2007), http://www.pewforum.org/Politics-and-Elections/How-the-Public-Perceives-Romney-
Mormons.aspx.
50. Frank Newport, Americans' Views of the Mormon Religion, GALLUP (Mar. 2, 2007), http://
www.gallup.com/poll/26758/americans-views-mormon-religion.aspx.
51. PEW RESEARCH CTR., LITTLE VOTER DISCOMFORT WITH ROMNEY'S MORMON RELIGION
(2012) [hereinafter LITTLE VOTER DISCOMFORT], available at http://www.pewforum.org/politics-
and-elections/2012-romney-mormonism-obamas-religion.aspx.
52. Lydia Saad, In U.S., 22% Are Hesitant to Support a Mormon in 2012, GALLUP (June 20,
2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/148100/hesitant-support-mormon-2012.aspx ("The stability in
U.S. bias against voting for a Mormon presidential candidate contrasts markedly with steep de-
clines in similar views toward several other groups over the past half-century, including blacks,
women, Catholics, and Jews. The last time as many as 22% of Americans said they would not
vote for any of these groups (the same level opposed to voting for a Mormon today) was 1959
for Catholics, 1961 for Jews, 1971 for blacks, and 1975 for women. As noted, opposition to
voting for each of these has since tapered off to single digits.").
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such as atheists. Compared to Mormons, atheists are met with a rela-
tively high degree of disapproval, as half of Americans say they would
not vote for an atheist presidential candidate (as of 2011). Unlike
Mormons, though, atheists' approval has been rising. In 1958, 75% of
Americans said that they would not cast a presidential ballot for an
atheist, compared to 51% in 1983 and 43% in 2012.53
The Gallup question asks about a hypothetical and thus unnamed
candidate, but in research I conducted with John Green and Quin
Monson in January of 2008, we found that voters reacted negatively
upon learning that Mitt Romney is Mormon. At the time, Romney
was a newcomer on the national scene and thus not well-known, al-
though he was still a viable candidate for the Republican nomination.
Support for Romney dropped by roughly thirty percentage points
when subjects in our study read a biographical vignette that included
the fact that Romney has been a local leader in the LDS Church
(compared to those who read the same vignette, minus the informa-
tion about Romney's religion). 54 In early 2008, other research de-
signed to minimize the bias toward "social desirability," whereby
people are reluctant to admit their prejudices, also found that 27% of
voters expressed concern about a Mormon presidential candidate. In
fact, this study found that, unlike discomfort with a candidate's race or
gender, concern about a Mormon president was not subject to social
desirability bias. Voters did not feel compunction about openly ad-
mitting that they would not vote for a Mormon for President, sug-
gesting that anti-Mormon attitudes are not checked by the same social
norms as racism and sexism. 55
While one can point to historical or theological tensions as the prox-
imate causes for unease with Mormonism, the overriding explanation
goes back to Aunt Susan and pal Al. There are relatively few Mor-
mon Aunt Susans and not many Americans have a close friend who is
Mormon. The comparison between Mormons and Jews is apt because
both groups are roughly the same size. They differ, however, in that
53. Jeffrey M. Jones, Atheists, Muslims See Most Bias as Presidential Candidates, GALLUP
(June 21, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/polIl155285/atheists-muslims-bias-presidential-candi-
dates.aspx.
54. See David E. Campbell, John C. Green & J. Quin Monson, The Stained Glass Ceiling:
Social Contact and Mitt Romney's "Religion Problem", 34 POL. BEHAV. 277, 289-90 (2012) ("In-
terestingly, the 0.3 drop in the probability of Romney's support caused by the Mormon frame is
roughly comparable to the share of the US population who openly say they will not vote for a
Mormon presidential candidate.").
55. Quin Monson, Social Equality Norms for Race, Gender, and Religion in the American
Public During the 2008 Presidential Primaries, Address at the Ohio State University Conference:
The Transformative Election of 2008 (Oct. 3, 2009), available at http://mershoncenter.osu.edu/
news/recordings/recordings09-10.htm.
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Mormons are less likely than Jews to have friends, neighbors, and
family members outside of their religion. According to the 2011 Faith
Matter survey, roughly 8% of Americans claim that they have a Mor-
mon as a close friend. By comparison, 18% of Americans have a close
friend who is Jewish. Mormons are less likely than almost any other
religious group to build bridges to members of other faiths.56
It is not that Mormons are deliberately insular, walling themselves
off from American society like the Old Order Amish. To the con-
trary, Mormons have demonstrated success in many different areas of
American culture: business (J.W. Marriott, Stephen R. Covey), sports
(Steve Young), entertainment (the Osmonds, David Archuleta), pub-
lishing (Stephanie Meyer), and politics (Harry Reid, Mitt Romney).
Rather, Mormons are an interesting challenge to the equilibrium of
religious tolerance in America. When stripped down to its essentials,
the story of religious tolerance is one of denominations, and even
whole religious traditions, morphing together. Whereas religions were
once divided by bright lines, today those boundaries have blurred.
Religious intermarriage was once discouraged or even forbidden; to-
day, it is commonplace and rarely controversial. Americans' embrace
of religious universalism-all good people can go to heaven-reflects
the weakening of the walls that once separated people of different
religions. Mormons, however, present a contrast to "blurry religion"
because they draw sharp boundaries around their faith. In the nine-
teenth century those boundaries were geographic, as Mormons gath-
ered in homogeneous communities-first in Ohio, then Missouri, then
Illinois, and eventually in Utah.5 7 Today, the boundaries are symbolic
but no less real.58 They adhere to a strict health code, have an ex-
tremely high level of engagement in religious activities, make substan-
tial financial contributions to their church, participate in esoteric
religious rites that are restricted only to devout members of their
church, and place great emphasis on marrying within the faith. 59 They
also regularly speak of their faith as the "only true church. '' 60 Given
56. PUTNAM & CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 525-26. The only religious groups whose members
are less likely to bridge to people of other religions are African-American Protestants and La-
tino Catholics-both defined by ethnicity as well as religion.
57. See generally MATTHEW BOWMAN, THE MORMON PEOPLE: THE MAKING OF AN AMERI-
CAN FAITH (2012) (providing a general history of Mormonism, including the settlements in Kirt-
land, Ohio; Jackson County, Missouri; and Nauvoo, Illinois).
58. See ARMAND L. MAUSS, THE ANGEL AND BEEHIVE: THE MORMON STRUGGLE WITH As-
SIMILATION 15-16 (1994).
59. See PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUB. LIFE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., MORMONS IN
AMERICA: CERTAIN IN THEIR BELIEFS, UNCERTAIN OF THEIR PLACE IN SOCIETY 35-50 (2012).
60. See Dallin H. Oaks, The Only True and Living Church, THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, https://www.lds.org/youth/article/only-true-living-church?lang=eng (last
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Mormons' distinctiveness and deep commitment to their faith, we
should not be surprised that they form tight-knit social networks. But,
of course, those networks come at the cost of fostering suspicion and
even hostility among other Americans, particularly evangelical
Protestants.
In recent years, discussion of attitudes toward Mormons has gone
from academic abstraction to political reality, owing to the presiden-
tial candidacy of Mitt Romney. As mentioned above, data collected
during Romney's unsuccessful campaign for the Republican nomina-
tion in the 2008 presidential cycle suggested that his Mormonism was
a real political liability. Romney's "Mormon problem" was compara-
ble to John F. Kennedy's "Catholic problem" in 1960.61 Romney even
delivered a major address on his religion in December 2007, much like
Kennedy did in 1960.
In the 2012 cycle, Romney's religion was mostly a back-page story.
Unlike both his own 2008 candidacy, and John F. Kennedy in 1960,
Romney chose not to give a single prominent speech about his relig-
ion. When Romney surrogates have broached the candidate's faith, it
has typically been to highlight Romney's time as a lay pastor
("bishop"). 62 To those voters who were listening, these experiences
humanized Romney, as they portrayed him as compassionate and
selfless. 63
Whether because of these efforts to "normalize" Romney's religion
or, more likely, out of partisan loyalty, Romney's Mormonism did not
appear to harm him in the general election among evangelical voters.
According to exit polls, 79% of white evangelicals voted for him. This
is the same level of support evangelicals gave George W. Bush in 2004
and six points higher than John McCain's share of the evangelical vote
in 2008.64
visited May 2, 2013); see also CLAUDIA L. BUSHMAN, CONTEMPORARY MORMONISM: LATTER-
DAY SAINTS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 14 (2006) ("A cornerstone of Mormon beliefs is that
Christianity, as originally established by Jesus Christ and his immediate followers, had gone
through an apostasy in which the original authority-the priesthood-was lost. . . . When
Mormons testify to their belief that the 'Church is true,' they mean that Joseph Smith restored
the Church of Jesus Christ.").
61. See SHAUN A. CASEY, THE MAKING OF A CATHOLIC PRESIDENT: KENNEDY VS. NIXON
1960 (2009).
62. See, e.g., Steve Holland, In Testimonials, Romney's Mormon Faith Takes Spotlight,
REUTERS, Aug. 31, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/31/us-usa-campaign-
romney-mormons-idUSBRE87U03F20120831.
63. See John M. Glionna & Mitchell Landsberg, Election a Win for Mormons, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 2012, at A16.
64. How the Faithful Voted: 2012 Preliminary Analysis, PEW F. ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE
(Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.pewforum.org/Politics-and-Elections/How-the-Faithful-Voted-2012-
Preliminary-Exit-Poll-Analysis.aspx.
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While Romney appears to have had the support of fellow Republi-
cans, especially evangelicals, does this mean his candidacy will be a
breakthrough for the public perception of Mormons? The data col-
lected during the campaign is ambiguous. In July 2012, the Pew Fo-
rum on Religion and Public Life released a report that found 20% of
voters who were aware of Romney's religion were "uncomfortable"
with it.65 Pew headlined its study "Little Voter Discomfort with Rom-
ney's Mormon Religion," but I would suggest that the results are
more ambiguous than that.66 In a classic case of having to decide
whether a glass is half empty or half full, it seems reasonable to inter-
pret 20% of voters openly expressing discomfort with a candidate's
religion as a lot, not a few. Imagine if 20% of voters said they were
uncomfortable with Barack Obama's race; I suspect the reaction
would be less sanguine. Twenty percent, you will recall, is also the
percentage of Americans that said that they would not vote for a Mor-
mon presidential candidate.
In other words, the data suggest that Mitt Romney assuaged con-
cerns about his Mormonism among evangelicals but, to borrow a met-
aphor, we do not yet know whether Mormonism will be able to ride
his coattails to widespread public acceptance. As with nones and
Muslims, attitudes toward Mormons appear to have a partisan cast. In
the same Pew study mentioned above, 16% of Democrats said that
they were uncomfortable with Romney's religion, compared to only
10% of Republicans.67 Similarly, Gallup reported in June 2012 that
responses to their generic "would you vote for a Mormon" question
were divided by voters' partisanship.68 Of course, in the midst of a
heated presidential campaign, we should not be surprised that these
questions were colored by voters' partisan lenses. Voters are likely to
respond to a question about a generic Mormon as a question about
Mitt Romney, just as many voters in 2008 would have inferred that
questions about an unnamed African-American candidate were really
about Barack Obama, and therefore responded accordingly. At this
point, it is not clear whether the current partisan reaction to Mormon-
ism is a temporary response to the presidential campaign of 2012, or
will become an enduring feature of the religious landscape.
65. See LITTLE VOTER DISCOMFORT, supra note 51.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 4.
68. Frank Newport, Bias Against a Mormon Presidential Candidate Same as in 1967, GALLUP
(June 21, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/155273/bias-against-mormon-presidential-candidate-
1967.aspx.
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Even if the partisan divisions do not linger, we do not yet know
whether Mitt Romney's candidacy will prove to be a turning point in
Americans' attitudes toward Mormons. Tens of millions of Americans
have now cast a presidential ballot for a Mormon, while many
thousands have contributed money to his campaign, shown up at his
rallies, and displayed campaign signs on his behalf. Even those who
did not support Romney saw a Mormon come close to winning the
White House, and hold his own while debating the President of the
United States. Will this soften attitudes toward Mormonism? The
jury is still out.
The Romney candidacy presents an opportunity for Mormons. The
past year or so has been described by many observers as the "Mormon
Moment" because of both Romney and the hit Broadway play The
Book of Mormon: The Musical.69 The research that Putnam and I
conducted suggests that positive perceptions of Mormons-or any re-
ligious group-are fostered through social relationships. If Mormons
are able to build on the current attention to their religion by creating
those connections, it seems likely that the public perception of
Mormons will improve. Put another way, the question is whether Mitt
Romney will lead to more Mormon Aunt Susans and pal Als.
Whether or not attitudes toward Mormons change in the wake of
Romney's campaign, I suggest that his candidacy nonetheless bodes
well for the overall state of religious tolerance. His nomination as the
Republican standard bearer is historic. Roughly 100 years ago, the
country was consumed with whether a Mormon could serve in the
U.S. Senate given that Reed Smoot had to endure three years of hear-
ings before he could be seated as a Senator from Utah. 70 Today, a
Mormon has been nominated to run for President of the United
States, and while there have been some concerns raised about his re-
ligion, he never faced the kind of outright anti-Mormonism that
Smoot faced.
69. PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUB. LIFE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., MORMONS IN AMERICA:
CERTAIN OF THEIR BELIEFS, UNCERTAIN OF THEIR PLACE IN SOCIETY 9 (2012), available at
http://www.pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Religious-Affiliation/Christian/Mormon/
Mormons%20in%20America.pdf ("With a Mormon candidate among the front-runners for the
2012 GOP presidential nomination, a musical about Mormons playing on Broadway and The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS) running television ads about ordinary
Mormons, America is in the midst of what some media accounts have dubbed a 'Mormon
moment."').
70. KATHLEEN FLAKE, THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS IDENTITY: THE SEATING OF
SENATOR REED SMOOT, MORMON APOSTLE 1-2 (2004).
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VII. PARTISANSHIP
As I have noted throughout this Article, I see the greatest threat to
religious tolerance as the mutual reinforcement of partisan identifica-
tion and attitudes toward different religious groups. The reason for
my concern lies in what the political science literature has learned
about the nature of party affiliation. One compelling theory of party
identification conceives of it as a social identity, not unlike other iden-
tities such as ethnicity or religion.71 The identity is formed because of
the groups commonly associated with each party: businesspeople and
the Republican party, union members and the Democratic party. Vot-
ers form a bond with a party both because of affinity toward "their"
own party's groups and antipathy toward the groups allied with the
other side. These group associations run deep into a voter's psyche
and are thus hard to change. If deep identification with a party be-
comes tightly intertwined with antagonism toward a particular relig-
ious group, religious tensions could spill over into the nation's ever-
bitter partisan battles, and become "baked into" our party system.
VIII. IMPLICATIONS OF RELIGIOUs TOLERANCE
Thus far, I have detailed three potential challenges to religious tol-
erance in America: the rise of the nones, Muslims, and Mormons. I
turn now to a different type of challenge posed by a norm of religious
tolerance, at least as it is expressed in the contemporary United
States. Simply put, the question is whether religious tolerance is, on
balance, salutary for American society. Since the publication of
American Grace, reviewers and commentators have often raised this
question. While Putnam and I laud America's religious tolerance,
some commentators have asked whether America's blurry religious
boundaries have enervated religion's role as a force for change. If
religious boundaries blur, does religion lose its prophetic voice? Writ-
ing about American Grace in the Dallas Morning News, Rod Dreher
described it as follows:
But it should be remembered that a religion that makes no demands
on people other than that they follow their bliss and be nice to eve-
rybody else is a religion that has no power to change minds and
hearts. It will not inspire people to heroic deeds of self-sacrifice for
the greater good. Nor is it likely to endure. 72
Dreher raises a good but open question: Does a religion have to be
particularistic to inspire self-sacrifice? I have given scores of public
71. See DONALD GREEN ET AL., PARTISAN HEARTS AND MINDS: POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE
SOCIAL IDENTITIES OF VOTERS 1-6 (2002).
72. Rod Dreher, All-American Grace, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Nov. 28, 2010.
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lectures about American Grace and often conclude the talk with that
quotation, asking the audience whether they think it is true. Invaria-
bly, someone in the audience will point to the most compelling
counter example of Dreher's point, namely the civil rights movement
of the twentieth century. The movement was born and nurtured in
churches and had strong religious overtones, but did not promote a
particular religious perspective, nor any religious view at all. And,
clearly, the civil rights movement inspired people to heroic deeds of
self-sacrifice for the common good.
I tend to agree with those audience members who question whether
religion must be exclusionary to be prophetic, in the sense of sum-
moning believers to change themselves or their society. The pro-life
movement provides another contemporary example. Catholics and
evangelical Protestants were once at theological loggerheads, but have
found common cause in their opposition to abortion. What theology
put asunder, politics has joined together.
Whatever the consequences for societal harmony, what are the con-
sequences of an Aunt Susan society for the internal vitality of particu-
lar religions? Interreligious bridge building can forge political
coalitions and tamp down religious strife, but what does it mean for
religious vigor? In their magisterial book The Churching of America,
Roger Finke and Rodney Stark argue that religions only flourish when
they are in tension with society. 73 Similarly, Christian Smith and his
colleagues speak of how evangelicalism has thrived because it is "em-
battled"-standing firm against a secular society that evangelicals see
as attacking their values.74 Tension and embattlement require a relig-
ion to be distinctive. Given the trend toward reduced distinctions and
tensions among religions, does this mean that the vitality of America's
religions will eventually peter out? Because religion remains a power-
ful form of identity, even in the age of Aunt Susan, its energy will not
be depleted any time soon. The question is whether that energy will
be replenished in future generations if religious boundaries continue
to blur. I leave this as a question, but one that observers of religion
should seek to answer in the years and decades to come.
IX. CONCLUSION
Groups like Muslims and Mormons thus face a dilemma. They are
both highly distinctive-in tension with secular society-and as em-
73. See FINKE & STARK, supra note 22, at 1-12.
74. See CHRISTIAN SMITH WITH MICHAEL EMERSON ET AL., AMERICAN EVANGELICALISM:
EMBATTLED AND THRIVING 121 (1998).
1032 [Vol. 62:1009
2013] RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE IN AMERICA 1033
battled as evangelicals ever were. As a consequence, they have not
yet been fully accepted into the religious mainstream. Should they
choose a path of greater assimilation into the mainstream-more
bridging than bonding-history suggests that they will gain greater ac-
ceptance within society, both by members of other faiths and people
without a religious affiliation. Yet, in doing so they risk losing the
very distinctiveness that fosters their religious vitality.
In closing, I am enough of an optimist to believe that, while there
will always be challenges to religious tolerance in America, the long-
term trends suggest that it will endure and even expand. The religious
protections of the First Amendment have created an environment
whereby both religious devotion and diversity can coexist symbioti-
cally, which is good for the overall state of religious tolerance. But
whether it is good for the internal vitality of any given religion re-
mains to be seen.
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